Concerns have been raised over the Nigeria Police Force’s stance on the enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Tinted Glass Permit policy, with the Executive Director of the Rule of Law and Accountability Advocacy Centre (RULAAC), Okechukwu Nwanguma, warning that the Police position risks undermining constitutional safeguards, judicial restraint, and public trust. Nwanguma reacted to a recent statement by the Police defending its authority to enforce the policy despite pending court cases.
According to Nwanguma, the Police reliance on the absence of a final or permanent restraining order reflects what he described as a narrow interpretation of the rule of law, one that prioritises institutional discretion over constitutional limits and the lived experiences of citizens, particularly given the history of abuse associated with tinted glass enforcement across the country.
The Nigeria Police Force’s statement on the Motor Vehicle Tinted Glass Permit Policy is polished, carefully worded, and institutionally defensive. However, beneath its reassuring tone lies a troubling interpretation of the rule of law that places police discretion above constitutional restraint, judicial prudence, and the realities faced daily by citizens.
At the heart of the Police argument is a technically correct but substantively flawed premise: that pending litigation does not extinguish police powers unless a court has issued a final or permanent restraining order. While this position may be legally convenient, it ignores a core democratic principle that state institutions ought to exercise restraint when the legality, scope, or manner of enforcement is under active judicial review, particularly where such enforcement has a long and documented history of abuse.
The rule of law, Nwanguma argues, is not satisfied merely by the absence of a final court order. It also requires respect for judicial processes, constitutional rights, proportionality, and the public interest. By insisting on its discretion to resume enforcement simply because no court has yet struck the policy down, the Police risk reducing the rule of law to a procedural loophole rather than treating it as a substantive safeguard.
He further noted that the Police statement failed to seriously engage with what he described as the real issue at stake: the systemic abuse that has historically accompanied tinted glass enforcement. Public opposition, he said, is rooted not in ignorance of the law but in lived experience, including arbitrary vehicle stops, extortion, profiling, intimidation, and violence at roadblocks.
According to him, repeated assurances of professionalism, moderation, and zero tolerance for extortion have been offered in the past without meaningful structural reform or accountability. Without clear enforcement guidelines, independent oversight, transparent permit processes, and publicly verifiable sanctions for misconduct, such assurances amount to rhetoric rather than reform.
Nwanguma expressed particular concern over portions of the Police statement which suggest that decisions on the timing and mode of enforcement lie entirely within police discretion. In his view, this expansive claim of discretion, especially while litigation is still pending, recreates the very conditions that previously eroded public trust.
He argued that democratic policing requires discretion to be tightly regulated, not broadly defended, especially in an environment where unchecked discretion has historically translated into abuse.
The Police statement also invokes public safety, linking tinted vehicles to crimes such as kidnapping and armed robbery. However, Nwanguma pointed out that no evidence was offered to demonstrate that previous tinted glass enforcement significantly reduced such crimes, nor was there an explanation for why insecurity persists despite years of similar enforcement efforts.
This, he said, reinforces the perception that tinted glass enforcement functions less as a targeted security strategy and more as a low-effort policing activity that disproportionately affects law-abiding citizens rather than organised criminal networks.
He also criticised what he described as the Police’s mischaracterisation of public concern as “undue pressure,” noting that civic scrutiny, criticism, and advocacy are constitutionally protected rights and essential democratic safeguards, particularly where policing practices have caused harm in the past.
Nwanguma questioned the urgency of reasserting enforcement authority at a time when court cases are pending, public trust remains fragile, and economic pressures on citizens are severe. He argued that a response consistent with the rule of law would have included suspending enforcement pending judicial determination, engaging transparently with civil society, publishing clear and binding enforcement protocols, and demonstrating accountability for past abuses.
In conclusion, he said the Police statement presents legality as a shield rather than as a responsibility. By relying on the absence of a final court order while downplaying broader constitutional, historical, and human rights considerations, the Police risk repeating a familiar cycle in which lawful authority is exercised in a manner that produces unlawful outcomes.
According to Nwanguma, in a democratic society policing is validated not only by statutory powers but by restraint, accountability, and public trust. Until those elements are demonstrably secured, he maintained that resuming tinted glass enforcement, regardless of legal technicalities, remains inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the rule of law.
